Difference between revisions of "Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions"

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|Author=Azevedo
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|CSP title=Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions
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|Type of file=pdf
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|CSP Author=Erick M. Azevedo and Paulo B.Correia
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|Type of publication=scientific publication
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|CSP Year=2006
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|Category_CSP_File=Research and Development
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|CSP Country=Brazil
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|Keyword 1=Economic feasability
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|Keyword 2=Regulation
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|CSP Type of Document=Research and development
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|Keyword 3=Authorization
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|CSP Language=English
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|Project stage=4
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|CSP Language AR=
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|Country_CSP=Brazil
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|Year of publication=2006
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|CSP Language URL en=https://www.dropbox.com/s/9fuhao3g4exfjd8/2006_Azevedo%20et%20al_Bidding%20strategies%20in%20Brazilian%20electricity%20auctions.pdf
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|CSP Abstract=Double bilateral contract auctions for electric energy purchase and sale occur in Brazil. These auctions present incomplete information and possess some subjectivity in relation to the future scenario of the Brazilian electric system, inserted in the agent’s bids. In this work, a model using Bayes’  rule  and  the  game  theory  is  proposed  to  aid  the  agent  in  its  bid  definition. 
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Through  the  existing  relations  between  the  Conditionalprobabilities of Bayes’ Rule, the model transforms beliefs into information.In this way, the absence of information is supplied and the problem is transformed into a game with complete information. The present study has no worries in terms of transmission constraints, since they are not usually considered in the bilateral contract auctions in Brazil. At the end, Nash equilibrium (NE) can be found through the expected payoff matrix of each agent.
 
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Latest revision as of 14:20, 20 July 2016




Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions

Title Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions
Author Erick M. Azevedo and Paulo B.Correia
Year 2006
Country Brazil
Type of Technology
Type of Document Research and development
File Download

► English: file on external website

Language(s) English
Abstract Double bilateral contract auctions for electric energy purchase and sale occur in Brazil. These auctions present incomplete information and possess some subjectivity in relation to the future scenario of the Brazilian electric system, inserted in the agent’s bids. In this work, a model using Bayes’ rule and the game theory is proposed to aid the agent in its bid definition.

Through the existing relations between the Conditionalprobabilities of Bayes’ Rule, the model transforms beliefs into information.In this way, the absence of information is supplied and the problem is transformed into a game with complete information. The present study has no worries in terms of transmission constraints, since they are not usually considered in the bilateral contract auctions in Brazil. At the end, Nash equilibrium (NE) can be found through the expected payoff matrix of each agent.


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