


## What We Want. Requirements of Renewable Energy Investors in Emerging Markets.



#### iidevelopment presentation for GIZ

#### Tunis – November 2013

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## What We Want. Requirements of Renewable Energy Investors in Emerging Markets.

- 1. Which types of investors are present in RE?
- 2. What do these investors want?
- 3. What can governments do to attract, keep and steer these investors? Examples for typical effects of policy on risk and yield expectations.





# 1. Which **types of investors** are present in Renewable Energy (RE)?

#### Institutional investors

i.e. Insurances, pension funds, savings unions, development banks, impact investors

#### **Commercial investors**

i.e. venture capital, special funds,structured bonds, electric utilities,independend power producers, ESCOs

#### **Private Investors**

i.e. SME, farmers, homeowners,

#### cooperatives

innovative infrastructure

These three types have differing motives and requirements!

Thus, always 3, instead of 2, indicators:

- 1. Risik
- 2. Yield
- 3. Other criteria




# 1. Which **types of investors** are present in Renewable Energy (RE)?

#### **Explanation of risk and yield:**

- RE are "Front Loaded", unlike conventional powerplants
- This is why risk (∆t>10a) is so important for yield expectations (want high ROI = DCF)
- Commercial investors in meerging markets aim to break even after 3-8 years due to high volatilities
- Much less than the 15 years typical for RE feed-in programmes in EU
- PPA >5 years credible?





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#### 2. What do these three investor types want?

#### Institutional investors

- Important: risk & SPV-Volatility
- Grants until around 2020ca 2020 for EZgoals= Other Criteria

#### **Commercial investors**

- Maximise F(risk, yield)
- Other criteria less relevant
- Country risk not applicable to local SMB

#### **Private Investors**

- Extremely amorphous group and very subjective assessments: self-sustainability, do-gooders, soldiers of fortune, ...
- Risk is underrated (no portfolio). Thus Yield + Other Criteria = liquidity, timing and nimbus









Figure 2: NPV as a Function of Investment Date





# 3. What can governments do? Examples.3.1. Risk determines expected yields


#### Profit excepted by Investors (3) depends on (1) country risk and (2) PV-specific Risk

	Germany 2011 (BASE CASE)*	Germany 2001	Brasil 2011**	Italy 2011	remarks
1. 10a Gov Bond	1.5%	4.5%	11%	6%	* Note that Risk Premium in D went UP in 2013 due to decreasing
2. PV Risk Premium	2.5%	5.0%	7%	7%	EEG predictability (NB this is separate from lower yield from lower FIT).
3. Reauired	4.0%	9.5%	18%	13%	**Note that Gov bonds went down in BRA from 2011 to 2013





#### <u>Country risk</u> $\rightarrow$ Energy ministers can hardly influence it







\*P\/ SP\/

## <u>Subsector risk</u> $\rightarrow$ A number of ministries can directly influence this: regulation can lower risk!

#### Global ranks of our 3 country cases for different indicators

					PV JPV	
Country Indicator	Brazil	Italy	Germany	source	importance	
Starting a Business	121	84	106	World Bank	3	
Dealing with Construction Permits	131	103	14	World Bank	5	
Getting Electricity	60	107	2	World Bank	5	
Registering Property	109	39	81	World Bank	3	
Getting Credit	104	104	23	World Bank	2	
Protecting Investors	82	49	100	World Bank	5	
Paying Taxes	156	131	72	World Bank	2	
Trading Across Borders	123	55	13	World Bank	1	
Enforcing Contracts	116	160	5	World Bank	4	
Resolving Insolvency	143	31	19	World Bank	0	
Corruption Perceptions	69	72	13	Transparency	4	
WBG average rank of country	110	86	44	indicators 1-10 (wbg)		
Our weighted "PV SPV rank"	101	92	42	<b>2</b> indicators 1-11 weighted with *		

128% WBG ratio Bra/Ita

110% PVSPV ratio Bra/Ita





## <u>Subsector risk</u> $\rightarrow$ A number of ministries can directly influence this: regulation can lower risk!

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Brazil		Italy		Germany			
procedure step	duration	procedure step	duration	procedure step	duration		
Request and obtain proof of land ownership from Real Estate Registry Office	2 days	Obtain nulla osta from the Regional Technical Office (Genio Civile)	30 days	Obtain building permit	25 days		
Request and obtain proof of land tax payment from Treasury of the Municipality	7 days	Obtain building permit	135 days	Application for approval of static calculation	21 days		
Register employees with the Social security Office	1 day	Hire an independent engineer to test structure	1 day	Receive inspection from District Chimney Sweeper	1 day		
Submit proof of payment to Social security	1 day	File Certified Notification of Starting Activity ("SCIAâ€)	1 day	Receive inspection of the building shell	1 day		
Request and obtain Construction Approval Permit and Construction Execution Permit	274 days	Register the building	5 days	Receive inspection after completion of the building ("Foermliche Bauabnahme")	1 day		
Request and obtain Equipment Operating Permit	60 days	Obtain occupancy certificate	30 days	Apply for water connection	1 day		
Request and receive frame inspection from Municipality	1 day	Receive on-site inspection by the Fire Department	1 day	Receive inspection by water company	1 day		
Request and receive inspection of the structures from Municipality	1 day	Apply for water and sewerage connection	1 day	Obtain water connection	45 days		
Request and receive labor inspection from Labor Public Attorneys' Office	1 day	Receive on-site inspection and estimation of water and sewerage installation costs	1 day	Obtain telephone line	45 days		
Request and receive sanitary inspection from Municipality	1 day	Obtain water and sewerage installation	29 days				
Request and obtain conclusion approval	60 days	Obtain telephone connection	15 days				
Receive final inspection from Municipality	1 day						
Request and receive Fire Department Inspection	31 days						
Request and obtain operation License	60 days						
Request and connect to water and sewage 30 days							
Request and connect to telephone 15 days							
	15 days		234				
Total Days (average)	469			97			
average months	15 1.3			3			
average years		0.3					



#### <u>Project risk</u> $\rightarrow$ Investors themselves can have an influence. For example EPC-Risk


	P: probability that the firm is alive in 2-2014 [% of 100]								
EPC	1	2	3	4	5	6			
А	50	65	70	90	75	95			
В	80	90		90	90	90			
С		40		50	60	70			
D		25				65			
E	80					60			
F		75	40	60	50	40			
G	50	7	30	40	50	40			
Н	30	60	80	50	30	55			
I	65	100	60	90	50	80			
J									

P (alive 2014)	rank	N	2σ	EPC	our overall rating
-					i di di ing
74%	2	6	15%	Α	Тор
88%	1	5	4%	В	Тор
55%	5	4	11%	С	Risky
45%	8	2	20%	D	No Go
70%	4	2	10%	E	Risky
53%	6	5	13%	F	Risky
36%	9	6	15%	G	No Go
51%	7	6	17%	Н	Risky
74%	2	6	17%	1	Тор
	10	0		J	No Go





# What can governments do? Examples. 3.2. The LCOE lies



**Figure 6:** Residential DV price parity (size of bubbles refers to market size) (BNEF, 2012a). Note: LCOE based on 6% veighted average cost of capital, 0.7%/year module degradation, 1% capex as O&M annually, \$3.0 VW apex assumed for 2012, \$2.00/W for 2015.



#### Source of graph & caption: Bazilian et al 2012




# 3. What can governments do? Examples.3.2. The LCOE lies

		Germany				LAC									
	D	end 2012	۵	0 2013 too low	L	AC private 2013/4	L	AC public 2013/4		L	AC private 2015	L	AC private 2016	L	AC private 2017
yield		1000		1000		2000		2000			2000		2000		2000
FIT \$/kWh	\$	0.20	\$	0.15		0.15		0.10		\$	0.14	\$	0.12	\$	0.11
yield*FIT p.a.		200,000		150,000	-	300,000		200,000	90%	\$	270,000	\$	243,000	\$	218,700
0&M		1.5%		1.5%		1.5%		1.5%			1.5%		1.5%		1.5%
	\$	(30,000)	\$	(30,000)	\$	(30,000)	\$	(30,000)		\$	(27,000)	\$	(24,300)	\$	(21,870)
TIR Proj		6%		2%		12%		6%			12%		<b>12%</b>		12%
EPC	\$	(2,000,000)	\$	(2,000,000)	\$	(2,000,000)	\$	(2,000,000)	90%	\$	(1,800,000)	\$	(1,620,000)	\$	(1,458,000)

		EK	FK	TIR
		1	9	
	D 2013 lowest "marginal Insti"	3.5%	4.0%	4.0%
		2	8	
	D 2012	10.0%	5.0%	6.0%
		4	6	
	LAC 2013 - low PV Risk	15.0%	10.0%	12.0%
iidevelopment		5	5	
innovative infrastructure	LAC 2013 - High PV Risk	25%	15%	20.0%



What can governments do? Examples.
3.3. Promotion of renewables influences investor types



innovative infrastructure


Source: adapted from EPIA 2012




(1990-2013)


# 3. What can governments do? Examples.3.3. Promotion of renewables influences investor types


#### PV installed capacity in Germany (up to july 2013)




Source: GIZ Heising et al.










#### **Problem:**

- Estimates of RE benefits in literature are extremely inaccurate. Little empirical work [RMI2013]
- Wrong methods and secondary effects
- Results = 4-40 US cents/kWh Error>100%!
- Wait for "smart grid" und batteries

#### GIZ sector projects:

iidevelopment innovative infrastructure

- **Operational Benefits: OpBen** at Optimal Dispatch
- Straightforward: Avoided fuel costs in actual generation parks
- Variation of up to 50% RE penetration without net loss of stability!!
- Results: OpBen = 10-15 US cents/kWh ± 10%
- Total benefits 2013 = 15-25 cents/kWh  $\pm 30\%$
- F (country, RE penetration rate, price of gas)




## Estimates of RE benefits are

 What can governments do? Examples.
Transparency minimizes risk! In the long-term, prices adjust to the economic optimum.

### Results:

- Benefits higher than estimates in literature
- High penetration rates are possible without necessarily hindering benefits
- Benefits may rise with higher penetration rates
- Spinning reserve plays much smaller role than expected





## What We Want.

### Which requirements do investors have for Renewable Energy in Emerging Markets?

Thank you for listening!

iidevelopment presentation for the GIZ Tunis – November 2013 Kilian Reiche – reiche@iidev.de

